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Abstract
In this paper, collaborative use of relays to form a beamforming system and provide physical-layer security is
investigated. In particular, decode-and-forward (DF) and amplify-and-forward (AF) relay beamforming designs under
total and individual relay power constraints are studied with the goal of maximizing the secrecy rates when perfect
channel state information (CSI) is available. In the DF scheme, the total power constraint leads to a closed-form
solution, and in this case, the optimal beamforming structure is identified in the low and high signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) regimes. The beamforming design under individual relay power constraints is formulated as an optimization
problem which is shown to be easily solved using two different approaches, namely semidefinite programming and
second-order cone programming. A simplified and suboptimal technique which reduces the computation complexity
under individual power constraints is also presented. In the AF scheme, not having analytical solutions for the
optimal beamforming design under both total and individual power constraints, an iterative algorithm is proposed to
numerically obtain the optimal beamforming structure and maximize the secrecy rates. Finally, robust beamforming
designs in the presence of imperfect CSI are investigated for DF-based relay beamforming, and optimization
frameworks are provided.
Index Terms: amplify-and-forward relaying, decode-and-forward relaying, physical-layer security, relay beam-
forming, robust beamforming, second-order cone programming, secrecy rates, semidefinite programming.
I. INTRODUCTION
The broadcast nature of wireless transmissions allows for the signals to be received by all users within
the communication range, making wireless communications vulnerable to eavesdropping. The problem of
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secure transmission in the presence of an eavesdropper was first studied from an information-theoretic per-
spective in [1] where Wyner considered a wiretap channel model. Wyner showed that secure communication
is possible without sharing a secret key if the eavesdropper’s channel is a degraded version of the main
channel, and identified the rate-equivocation region and established the secrecy capacity of the degraded
discrete memoryless wiretap channel. The secrecy capacity is defined as the maximum achievable rate from
the transmitter to the legitimate receiver, which can be attained while keeping the eavesdropper completely
ignorant of the transmitted messages. Later, Wyner’s result was extended to the Gaussian channel in [3] and
recently to fading channels in [4] and [5]. In addition to the single antenna case, secrecy in multi-antenna
models is addressed in [6] and [7]. One particular result in [6] and [7] that is related to our study is that
for the MISO secrecy channel, the optimal transmitting strategy is beamforming based on the generalized
eigenvector of two matrices that depend on the channel coefficients. Regarding multiuser models, Liu et al.
[8] presented inner and outer bounds on secrecy capacity regions for broadcast and interference channels.
The secrecy capacity of the multi-antenna broadcast channel is obtained in [9].
Having multiple antennas at the transmitter and receiver has multitude of benefits in terms of increasing
the performance, and provides the potential to improve the physical-layer security as well. Additionally,
it is well known that even if they are equipped with single-antennas individually, users can cooperate to
form a distributed multi-antenna system by performing relaying [13]–[15]. When channel side information
(CSI) is exploited, relay nodes can collaboratively work similarly as in a MIMO system to build a virtual
beam towards the receiver. Relay beamforming research has attracted much interest recently (see e.g.,
[16]–[20] and references therein). The optimal power allocation at the relays has been addressed in [17]
and [18] when instantaneous CSI is known. In [19], the problem of distributed beamforming in a relay
network is considered with the availability of second-order statistics of CSI. Most recently, Zheng et al. [20]
have addressed the robust collaborative relay beamforming design by optimizing the weights of amplify-
and-forward (AF) relays. They maximize the worst-case signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) assuming that CSI
is imperfect but bounded. Transmit beamforming and receive beamforming strategies have been studied
extensively for over a decade. A recent tutorial paper [12] provides an overview of advanced convex
optimization approaches to both transmit, receive and network beamforming problems, and includes a
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comprehensive list of references in this area.
Cooperative relaying under secrecy constraints was also recently studied in [21]–[23] . In [21], a decode-
and-forward (DF) based cooperative protocol is considered, and a beamforming system is designed for
secrecy capacity maximization or transmit power minimization. For amplify-and-forward (AF), suboptimal
closed-form solutions that optimize bounds on secrecy capacity are proposed in [22]. However, in those
studies, the analysis is conducted only under total relay power constraints and perfect CSI assumption. In
this paper, we investigate the collaborative relay beamforming under secrecy constraints in the presence
of both total and individual power constraints with the assumptions of perfect and imperfect channel
knowledge.
More specifically, our contributions in this paper are as follows:
1) In DF, under total power constraints, we analytically determine the beamforming structure in the
high- and low-SNR regimes.
2) In DF, under individual power constraints, not having analytical solutions available, we provide an
optimization framework to obtain the optimal beamforming that maximizes the secrecy rate. We use
the semidefinite relaxation (SDR) approach to approximate the problem as a convex semidefinite
programming (SDP) problem which can be solved efficiently. We also provide an alternative method
by formatting the original optimization problem as a convex second-order cone programming (SOCP)
problem that can be efficiently solved by interior point methods. Also, we describe a simplified
suboptimal beamformer design under individual power constraints.
3) In AF, we first obtain an expression for the achievable secrecy rate, and then we show that the optimal
beamforming solution that maximizes the secrecy rate can be obtained by semidefinite programming
with a two dimensional search for both total and individual power constraints.
4) Two robust beamforming design methods for DF relaying are described in the case of imperfect CSI.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section II, we describe the channel model and
study the beamforming design for DF relaying under secrecy constraints. Beamforming for AF relaying
is investigated in Section III. In Section IV, robust beamforming design in the case of imperfect CSI is
studied. Numerical results for the performance of different beamforming schemes are provided in Section
3
Fig. 1. Channel Model
V. Finally, we conclude in Section VI.
II. DECODE-AND-FORWARD RELAYING
We consider a communication channel with a source S, a destination D, an eavesdropper E, and M
relays {Rm}Mm=1 as depicted in Figure 1. In this model, the source S tries to transmit confidential messages
to destination D with the help of the relays while keeping the eavesdropper E ignorant of the information.
We assume that there is no direct link between S and D, and S and E. Hence, initially messages transmitted
by the source are received only by the relays. Subsequently, relays work synchronously and multiply the
signals with complex weights {wm} and produce a virtual beam point to the destination. We denote the
channel coefficient between the source S and the mth relay Rm as gm ∈ C, the channel coefficient between
Rm and the destination D as hm ∈ C, and the channel coefficient between Rm and eavesdropper E as
zm ∈ C.
It is obvious that our channel is a two-hop relay network. In the first hop, the source S transmits xs to
the relays with power E[|xs|2] = Ps. The received signal at Rm is given by
yr,m = gmxs + ηm (1)
where ηm is the background noise that has a complex, circularly symmetric Gaussian distribution with
zero mean and variance of Nm.
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In the second hop, we employ decode-and-forward transmission scheme. In this scheme, each relay
first decodes the message xs and normalizes it as x′s = xs/
√
Ps. Subsequently, the normalized message is
multiplied by the weight factor wm by the mth relay to generate the transmitted signal xr = wmx′s. The
output power of the mth relay Rm is given by
E[|xr|2] = E[|wmx′s|2] = |wm|2. (2)
The received signals at the destination D and eavesdropper E are the superpositions of the signals
transmitted from the relays. These signals can be expressed, respectively, as
yd =
M∑
m=1
hmwmx
′
s + n0 = h
†wx′s + n0, and (3)
ye =
M∑
m=1
zmwmx
′
s + n1 = z
†wx′s + n1 (4)
where n0 and n1 are the Gaussian background noise components at D and E, respectively, with zero mean
and variance N0. Additionally, we have defined h = [h∗1, ....h∗M ]T , z = [z∗1 , ....z∗M ]T , and w = [w1, ...wM ]T
where superscript ∗ denotes conjugate operation, and (·)T and (·)† denote the transpose and conjugate
transpose, respectively, of a matrix or vector. The metrics of interest are the received SNR levels at D and
E, which are given, respectively, by
Γd =
|∑Mm=1 hmwm|2
N0
and Γe =
|∑Mm=1 zmwm|2
N0
. (5)
It is well-known that given the channel coefficients, the secrecy rate Rs over the channel between the
relays and destination is (see e.g., [3])
Rs = I(x
′
s; yd)− I(x′s; ye) (6)
= log(1 + Γd)− log(1 + Γe) (7)
= log
(
N0 + |
∑M
m=1 hmwm|2
N0 + |
∑M
m=1 zmwm|2
)
(8)
where I(·; ·) denotes the mutual information, and x′s is Gaussian distributed with zero-mean and E[|x′s|2] =
1. Coding strategies that achieve the secrecy rates involve randomization at the encoder to introduce
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uncertainty to the eavesdropper. Secrecy coding techniques are discussed in detail in [1] – [5]. Practical
coding schemes for secure communications have been studied in [10] and [11] for certain special cases of
the wiretap channel. It is important to note that we assume in the decode-and-forward scenario that the
relays use the same secrecy codebook and transmit the same signal x′s simultaneously. We further note that
we throughout the text are interested in beamforming vectors that satisfy for given channel coefficients the
inequality, N0 + |
∑M
m=1 hmwm|2 > N0 + |
∑M
m=1 zmwm|2. If there are no such beamforming vectors and
the ratio inside the logarithm in (8) is less than 1, then the secrecy rate, by definition, is zero meaning that
secure transmission cannot be established. The beamforming vectors which lead to zero secrecy capacity
are not of interest.
In this section, we address the joint optimization of {wm} and hence identify the optimum collaborative
relay beamforming (CRB) direction that maximizes the secrecy rate given in (8). Initially, we assume
that the perfect knowledge of the channel coefficients is available. Later, in Section IV, we address the
case in which the channel coefficients are only imperfectly known. We would like to also remark that the
secrecy rate expression in (8) in a fading environment represents the instantaneous secrecy rate for given
instantaneous values of the channel fading coefficients. Hence, in such a case, our formulation considers
the optimization of {wm} in order to maximize the instantaneous secrecy rates.
A. Optimal Beamforming under Total Power Constraints
In this section, we consider a total relay power constraint in the following form: ||w||2 = w†w ≤ PT .
The optimization problem can now be formulated as follows:
Rs(h, z, PT ) = max
w†w≤PT
log
(
N0 + |
∑M
m=1 hmwm|2
N0 + |
∑M
m=1 zmwm|2
)
= log max
w†w≤PT
N0 + |
∑M
m=1 hmwm|2
N0 + |
∑M
m=1 zmwm|2
(9)
= log max
w†w≤PT
w†(N0
PT
I+ hh†)w
w†(N0
PT
I+ zz†)w
(10)
= log max
w†w≤PT
w†(N0I+ PThh†)w
w†(N0I+ PTzz†)w
(11)
= log λmax(N0I+ PThh
†, N0I+ PTzz
†) (12)
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where λmax(A,B) is the largest generalized eigenvalue of the matrix pair (A,B) 1. Hence, the maximum
secrecy rate in (12) is achieved by the optimal beamforming vector
wopt = ςu (13)
where u is the eigenvector that corresponds to λmax(N0I+PThh†, N0I+PTzz†) and ς is chosen to ensure
w
†
optwopt = PT . Note that in the first-hop of the channel model, the maximum rate we can achieve is
R1 = min
m=1,...,M
log
(
1 +
|gm|2Ps
Nm
)
. (14)
Since we want all relays to successfully decode the signal transmitted from the source in the DF scenario,
the rate expression in (14) is equal to the minimum of the rates required for reliable decoding at the relays.
Hence, the first-hop rate is dictated by the worst channel among the channels between the source and the
relays.
The overall secrecy rate is
Rdof,s = min(R1, Rs). (15)
Above, we observe that having a severely weak source-relay channel can significantly degrade the perfor-
mance. In these cases, other forwarding techniques (e.g., amplify-and-forward) can be preferred. Throughout
the analysis of the DF scenario, we will not explicitly address these considerations and we will concentrate
on the secure communication between the relays and the destination. Hence, we will have the implicit
assumption that the the source-relay links do not constitute a bottleneck for communication.
Next, we provide some remarks on the performance of collaborative relay beamforming in the high-
and low-SNR regimes. Optimal beamforming under total power constraints is studied in detail in [21] and
[22]. However, these studies have not identified the beamforming structure at low and high SNR levels.
For simplicity, we assume in the following that the noise variances at the destination and eavesdropper are
N0 = 1.
1For a Hermitian matrix A ∈ Cn×n and positive definite matrix B ∈ Cn×n, (λ,ψ) is referred to as a generalized eigenvalue – eigenvector
pair of (A,B) if (λ, ψ) satisfy Aψ = λBψ [28].
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1) High-SNR Regime: In the high SNR scenario, where both Ps, PT →∞ , we can easily see that
lim
Ps→∞
(R1 − logPs) = min
m=1,...,M
log(|gm|2/Nm). (16)
From the Corollary 4 in Chapter 4 of [7], we can see that
lim
PT→∞
(Rs − log(PT )) = log(max
ψ˜
|h†ψ˜|2) (17)
where ψ˜ is a unit vector on the null space of z†. This result implies that choosing the beamforming vectors
to lie in the null spaces of the eavesdropper’s channel vector, i.e., having |∑Mm=1 zmwm|2 = z†w = 0,
is asymptotically optimal in the high-SNR regime. In this case, the eavesdropper cannot receive any data
from the relays, and secrecy is automatically guarantied. No secrecy coding is needed at the relays. This
asymptotic optimality can be seen from the following discussion. Assume that we impose the constraint
z†w = 0. Now, the optimization problem (under the assumption N0 = 1) becomes
max
w†w≤PT
z†w=0
log

1 +
∣∣∣∑Mm=1 hmwm∣∣∣2
1 +
∣∣∣∑Mm=1 zmwm∣∣∣2

 = max
w†w≤PT
z†w=0
log

1 +
∣∣∣∣∣
M∑
m=1
hmwm
∣∣∣∣∣
2

 (18)
= max
wˆ†wˆ≤1
z†wˆ=0
log

1 +
∣∣∣∣∣
M∑
m=1
hmwˆm
√
PT
∣∣∣∣∣
2

 (19)
= log(PT ) + max
wˆ†wˆ≤1
z†wˆ=0
log

√ 1
PT
+
∣∣∣∣∣
M∑
m=1
hmwˆm
∣∣∣∣∣
2

 (20)
≈ log(PT ) + log

 max
wˆ†wˆ≤1
z†wˆ=0
∣∣∣∣∣
M∑
m=1
hmwˆm
∣∣∣∣∣
2

 (21)
= log(PT ) + log(max
ψ˜
|h†ψ˜|2) (22)
such that z†ψ = 0 and ‖ψ‖2 = 1. Above in (19), we have defined wˆ = w/√PT for which the constraint
becomes wˆ†wˆ ≤ 1. The approximation in (21) is due to the fact that 1√
PT
becomes negligible for large
PT . Hence, null space beamforming provides the same asymptotic performance as in (17) and is optimal
in the high-SNR regime.
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Furthermore, the optimal null space beamforming vector can be obtained explicitly. Due to the null
space constraint, we can write w = H⊥z v, where H⊥z denotes the projection matrix onto the null space of
z†. Specifically, the columns of H⊥z are orthonormal vectors that form the basis of the null space of z†. In
our case, H⊥z is an M × (M − 1) matrix. The power constraint w†w = v†H⊥z †H⊥z v = v†v ≤ PT . Then,
the optimization problem can be recast as
max
w†w≤PT
log

1 +
∣∣∣∣∣
M∑
m=1
hmwm
∣∣∣∣∣
2

 = log(1 + max
w†w≤PT
(w†hh†w)
)
(23)
= log
(
1 + max
v†v≤PT
(v†H⊥z
†
hh†H⊥z v)
)
(24)
= log
(
1 + PTλmax(H
⊥
z
†
hh†H⊥z )
)
(25)
= log
(
1 + PTh
†H⊥z H
⊥
z
†
h
)
. (26)
Therefore, the optimum null space beamforming vector w is
wopt,n = H
⊥
z v = ς1H
⊥
z H
⊥
z
†
h (27)
where ς1 is a constant that is introduced to satisfy the power constraint.
2) Low-SNR Regime: In the low SNR regime, in which both Ps, PT → 0, we can see that
lim
Ps→0
R1
Ps
= min
m=1,...,M
|gm|2
Nm
, and (28)
lim
Ps→0
Rs
PT
= λmax(hh
† − zz†). (29)
Thus, in the low SNR regime, the direction of the optimal beamforming vector approaches that of the
eigenvector that corresponds to the largest eigenvalue of hh†−zz†. A similar result is shown in a multiple-
antenna setting in [24].
B. Optimal Beamforming under Individual Power Constraints
In a multiuser network such as the relay system we study in this paper, it is practically more relevant to
consider individual power constraints as wireless nodes generally operate under such limitations. Motivated
9
by this, we now impose |wm|2 ≤ pm ∀m or equivalently |w|2 ≤ p where | · |2 denotes the element-wise
norm-square operation and p is a column vector that contains the components {pm}. In what follows, the
problem of interest will be again be the maximization of the secrecy rate or equivalently the maximization
of the term inside logarithm function of Rs (8) but now under individual power constraints:
max
|w|2≤p
N0 + |
∑M
m=1 hmwm|2
N0 + |
∑M
m=1 zmwm|2
(30)
= max
|w|2≤p
N0 +w
†hh†w
N0 +w†zz†w
. (31)
1) Semidefinite Relaxation (SDR) Approach: We first consider a semidefinite programming method
similar to that in [19]. Using the definition X , ww†, we can rewrite the optimization problem in (31)
as
max
X
N0 + tr(hh
†X)
N0 + tr(zz†X)
s.t diag(X) ≤ p
rank X = 1, and X  0
(32)
or equivalently as
max
X,t
t
s.t tr(X(hh† − tzz†)) ≥ N0(t− 1),
diag(X) ≤ p,
rank X = 1, and X  0
(33)
where tr(·) represents the trace of a matrix, diag(X) denotes the vector whose components are the diagonal
elements of X, and X  0 means that X is a symmetric positive semi-definite matrix. The optimization
problem in (33) is not convex and may not be easily solved. Let us now ignore the rank constraint in (33).
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That is, using a semidefinite relaxation (SDR), we aim to solve the following optimization problem:
max
X,t
t
s.t tr(X(hh† − tzz†)) ≥ N0(t− 1),
and diag(X) ≤ p, and X  0.
(34)
If the matrix Xopt obtained by solving the optimization problem in (34) happens to be rank one, then
its principal component will be the optimal solution to the original problem. Note that the optimization
problem in (34) is quasiconvex. In fact, for any value of t, the feasible set in (34) is convex. Let tmax be
the maximum value of t obtained by solving the optimization problem (34). If, for any given t, the convex
feasibility problem
find X
such that tr(X(hh† − tzz†)) ≥ N0(t− 1),
and diag(X) ≤ p, and X  0
(35)
is feasible, then we have tmax ≥ t. Conversely, if the convex feasibility optimization problem (35) is
not feasible, then we conclude tmax < t. Therefore, we can check whether the optimal value tmax of the
quasiconvex optimization problem in (34) is smaller than or greater than a given value t by solving the
convex feasibility problem (35). If the convex feasibility problem (35) is feasible then we know tmax ≥ t.
If the convex feasibility problem (35) is infeasible, then we know that tmax < t. Based on this observation,
we can use a simple bisection algorithm to solve the quasiconvex optimization problem (34) by solving
a convex feasibility problem (35) at each step. We assume that the problem is feasible, and start with an
interval [l, u] known to contain the optimal value tmax. We then solve the convex feasibility problem at
its midpoint t = (l + u)/2 to determine whether the optimal value is larger or smaller than t. We update
the interval accordingly to obtain a new interval. That is, if t is feasible, then we set l = t, otherwise, we
choose u = t and solve the convex feasibility problem again. This procedure is repeated until the width of
the interval is smaller than the given threshold. Note that the technique of using bisection search to solve
the SDP feasibility problem is also given in [27]. Once the maximum feasible value for tmax is obtained,
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one can solve
min
X
tr(X)
s.t tr(X(hh† − tmaxzz†)) ≥ N0(tmax − 1),
and diag(X) ≤ p, and X  0
(36)
to get the solution Xopt. (36) is a convex problem which can be solved efficiently using interior-point
based methods.
To solve the convex feasibility problem, one can use the well-studied interior-point based methods as
well. We use the well-developed interior point method based package SeDuMi [34], which produces a
feasibility certificate if the problem is feasible, and its popular interface Yalmip [35]. In semidefinite
relaxation, the solution may not be rank one in general. Interestingly, in our extensive simulation results,
we have never encountered a case where the solution Xopt to the SDP problem has a rank higher than one.
In fact, there is always a rank one optimal solution for our problem as will be explained later. Therefore,
we can obtain our optimal beamforming vector from the principal component of the optimal solution Xopt.
2) Second-order Cone Program (SOCP) Approach: The reason that the SDR method is optimal for
the above problem is that we can reformulate it as a second order cone problem [25] [26] by ignoring
the phase in which we optimize w directly rather than performing the optimization over X = ww†. This
provides us with another way of solving the optimization. The optimization problem (30) is equivalent to
max
w,t
t (37)
s.t
N0 + |h†w|2
N0 + |z†w|2 ≥ t (38)
and |w|2 ≤ p.
Note that (38) can be written as
1
t
|h†w|2 ≥
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥

 z†w√(
1− 1
t
)
N0


∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
= |z†w|2 +
(
1− 1
t
)
N0. (39)
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where the equality on the right hand side of (39) follows from the definition of the magnitude-square of a
vector. The equivalence of (38) and (39) can easily be seen by rearranging the terms in (39). In the above
formulation, we have implicitly assumed that t ≥ 1. Note that this assumption does not lead to loss of
generality as we are interested in cases in which N0+|h
†w|2
N0+|z†w|2 > 1. If this ratio is less than 1, the secrecy
rate, as discussed before, is zero.
Observe that an arbitrary phase rotation can be added to the beamforming vector without affecting the
constraint in (38). Thus, h†w can be chosen to be real without loss of generality. We can take the square
root of both sides of (39). The constraint becomes a second-order cone constraint, which is convex. The
optimization problem now becomes
max
w,t
t
s.t
√
1
t
h†w ≥
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥

 z†w√(
1− 1
t
)
N0


∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ and |w|
2 ≤ p.
(40)
As described in the SDR approach, the optimal solution of (40) can be obtained by repeatedly checking the
feasibility and using a bisection search over t with the aid of interior point methods for second order cone
program. Again, we use SeduMi together with Yalmip in our simulations. Once the maximum feasible
value tmax is obtained, we can then solve the following second order cone problem (SOCP) to obtain the
optimal beamforming vector:
min
w
||w||2
s.t
√
1
tmax
h†w ≥
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥

 z
†w√(
1− 1
tmax
)
N0


∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ and |w|
2 ≤ p.
(41)
Thus, we can get the secrecy rate Rs,ind for the second-hop relay beamforming system under individual
power constraints employing the above two numerical optimization methods. Then, combined with the
first-hop source relay link rate R1, secrecy rate of the decode and forward collaborative relay beamforming
system becomes Rdof,ind = min(R1, Rs,ind).
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3) Simplified Suboptimal Design: As shown above, the design of the beamformer under individual
relay power constraints requires an iterative procedure in which, at each step, a convex feasibility problem
is solved. We now propose a suboptimal beamforming vector that can be obtained without significant
computational complexity.
We choose a simplified beamformer as wsim = θwopt where wopt is given by (13) with ||wopt||2 = PT =∑
pi where pi is the individual power constraint for the ith relay, and we choose
θ =
1
|wopt,k|/√pk (42)
where wopt,k and pk are the kth entries of wopt and p respectively, and we choose k as
k = arg max
1≤i≤M
|wopt,i|2
pi
(43)
Substituting this beamformer wsim into (8), we get the achievable suboptimal rate under individual power
constraints.
III. AMPLIFY-AND-FORWARD RELAYING
Another common relaying scheme in practice is amplify-and-forward relaying. In this scenario, the
received signal at the mth relay Rm is directly multiplied by lmwm without decoding, and forwarded to
D. The relay output can be written as
xr,m = wmlm(gmxs + ηm). (44)
The scaling factor,
lm =
1√|gm|2Ps +Nm , (45)
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is used to ensure E[|xr,m|2] = |wm|2. The received signals at the destination D and eavesdropper E are
the superposition of the messages sent by the relays. These received signals are expressed, respectively, as
yd =
M∑
m=1
hmwmlm(gmxs + ηm) + n0, and (46)
ye =
M∑
m=1
zmwmlm(gmxs + ηm) + n1. (47)
Now, it is easy to compute the received SNR at D and E as
Γd =
|∑Mm=1 hmgmlmwm|2Ps∑M
m=1 |hm|2l2m|wm|2Nm +N0
, and (48)
Γe =
|∑Mm=1 zmgmlmwm|2Ps∑M
m=1 |zm|2l2m|wm|2Nm +N0
. (49)
The secrecy rate is now given by
Rs = I(xs; yd)− I(xs; ye) (50)
= log(1 + Γd)− log(1 + Γe) (51)
= log
(
|∑Mm=1 hmgmlmwm|2Ps +∑Mm=1 |hm|2l2m|wm|2Nm +N0
|∑Mm=1 zmgmlmwm|2Ps +∑Mm=1 |zm|2l2m|wm|2Nm +N0
×
∑M
m=1 |zm|2l2m|wm|2Nm +N0∑M
m=1 |hm|2l2m|wm|2Nm +N0
)
. (52)
Again, we maximize this term by optimizing {wm} jointly with the aid of perfect CSI. It is obvious that
we only have to maximize the term inside the logarithm function. Let us define
hg = [h
∗
1g
∗
1l1, ..., h
∗
Mg
∗
M lM ]
T , (53)
hz = [z
∗
1g
∗
1l1, ..., z
∗
Mg
∗
M lM ]
T , (54)
Dh = Diag(|h1|2l21N1, ..., |hM |2l2MNM), and (55)
Dz = Diag(|z1|2l21N1, ..., |zM |2l2MNM). (56)
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Then, the received SNR at the destination and eavesdropper can be reformulated, respectively, as
Γd =
Psw
†hghg
†w
w†Dhw +N0
=
Pstr(hghg
†ww†)
tr(Dhww†) +N0
, and (57)
Γe =
Psw
†hzhz
†w
w†Dzw +N0
=
Pstr(hzhz
†ww†)
tr(Dzww†) +N0
. (58)
With these notations, we can write the objective function of the optimization problem as
1 + Γd
1 + Γe
=
1 + Psw
†hghg
†w
w†Dhw+N0
1 + Psw
†hzhz
†w
w†Dzw+N0
(59)
=
w†Dhw +N0 + Psw†hghg
†w
w†Dzw +N0 + Psw†hzhz
†w
× w
†Dzw +N0
w†Dhw +N0
(60)
=
N0 + tr((Dh + Pshghg
†)ww†)
N0 + tr((Dz + Pshzhz
†)ww†)
× N0 + tr(Dzww
†)
N0 + tr(Dhww†)
. (61)
If we denote t1 = N0+tr((Dh+Pshghg
†)ww†)
N0+tr((Dz+Pshzhz
†)ww†)
, t2 =
N0+tr(Dzww†)
N0+tr(Dhww†)
, and use the similar SDR approach as
described in the DF case, we can express the optimization problem as
max
X,t1,t2
t1t2
s.t tr (X (Dz − t2Dh)) ≥ N0(t2 − 1)
tr
(
X
(
Dh + Pshghg
† − t1
(
Dz + Pshzhz
†))) ≥ N0(t1 − 1)
and diag(X) ≤ p, (and/or tr(X) ≤ PT ) and X  0.
(62)
Notice that this formulation is applied to both total relay power constraint and individual relay power
constraint which are represented by tr(X) ≤ PT and diag(X) ≤ p, respectively. When there is only total
power constraint, we can easily compute the maximum values of t1 and t2 separately since now we have
Rayleigh quotient problems. These maximum values are
t1,u = λmax
(
Dh +
N0
PT
I+ Pshghg
†,Dz +
N0
PT
I+ Pshzhz
†
)
, (63)
t2,u = λmax
(
Dz +
N0
PT
I,Dh +
N0
PT
I
)
. (64)
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When there are individual power constraints imposed on the relays, we can use the bisection algorithm
similarly as in the DF case to get the maximum values t1,i,u and t2,i,u 2 for t1 and t2 by repeatedly solving
the following two feasibility problems:
find X
s.t tr
(
X
(
Dh + Pshghg
† − t1
(
Dz + Pshzhz
†))) ≥ N0(t1 − 1)
and diag(X) ≤ p, and X  0,
(65)
and
find X
s.t tr (X (Dz − t2Dh)) ≥ N0(t2 − 1)
and diag(X) ≤ p, and X  0.
(66)
Note that for both total and individual power constraints, the maximum values of t1 and t2 are obtained
separately above, and these values are in general attained by different X = ww†. Now, the following
strategy can be used to obtain achievable secrecy rates. For those X values that correspond to t1,i,u and t1,u
(i.e., the maximum t1 values under individual and total power constraints, respectively), we can compute the
corresponding t2 = N0+tr(Dzww
†)
N0+tr(Dhww†)
and denote them as t2,i,l and t2,l for individual and total power constraints,
respectively. Then, log(t1,i,ut2,i,l) and log(t1,ut2,l) will serve as our amplify-and-forward achievable rates
for individual and total power constraints, respectively. With the achievable rates, we propose the following
algorithm to iteratively search over t1 and t2 to get the optimal t1,o and t2,o that maximize the product t1t2
2Subscripts i in t1,i,u and t2,i,u are used to denote that these are the maximum values in the presence of individual power constraints.
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by checking following feasibility problem.
find X  0
s.t tr (X (Dz − t2Dh)) ≥ N0(t2 − 1)
tr
(
X
(
Dh + Pshghg
† − t1
(
Dz + Pshzhz
†))) ≥ N0(t1 − 1)
and tr(X) ≤ PT if there is total power constraint,
or diag(X) ≤ p if there is individual power constraint.
(67)
A. Proposed Algorithm
Define the resolution ∆t = t1,u
N
or ∆t =
t1,i,u
N
for some large N for total and individual power constraints,
respectively.
1) Initialize t1,o = t1,u , t2,o = t2,l when total power constraint is imposed, and t1,o = t1,i,u, t2,o = t2,i,l
when individual power constraint is imposed. Initialize the iteration index i = N .
2) Set t1 = i∆t. If t1t2,u < t1,ot2,o (total power constraint) or t1t2,i,u < t1,ot2,o (individual power
constraint), then go to Step (3). Otherwise,
a) Let t2 = t1,ot2,ot1 . Check the feasibility problem (67). If it is infeasible, i = i− 1 go to step (2).
If it is feasible, use the bisection algorithm in (67) with t1 to get the maximum possible values
of t2 and denote this maximum as t2,m. The initial interval in the above bisection algorithm
can be chosen as [ t1,ot2,o
t1
, t2,u] or [
t1,ot2,o
t1
, t2,i,u] depending on the power constraints.
b) Update t1,o = t1, t2,o = t2,m , i = i− 1. Go back to step (2).
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3) Solve the following problem to get the optimal X
min
X
tr(X)
s.t tr (X (Dz − t2,oDh)) ≥ N0(t2,o − 1)
tr
(
X
(
Dh + Pshghg
† − t1,o
(
Dz + Pshzhz
†))) ≥ N0(t1,o − 1)
X  0 and
tr(X) ≤ PT if there is total power constraint,
diag(X) ≤ p if there is individual power constraint.
(68)
B. Discussion of the Algorithm
Our algorithm is a two-dimensional search over all possible pairs (t1, t2), which can produce the greatest
product t1t2, whose logarithm will be the global maximum value of the secrecy rate. In the following, we
will illustrate how our algorithm works for individual power constraints. Similar discussion applies to the
total power constraint case as well. The algorithm initiates with the achievable pair (t1,i,u, t2,i,l), in which
t1,i,u is the maximum feasible value for t1. Thus, all t1 values in our search lie in [0, t1,i,u]. We chose the
resolution parameter N to equally pick N points in this interval. We then use a brute force strategy to
check each point iteratively starting from t1,i,u down to 0. In each iteration, the feasibility problem (67)
is quasi-convex. Thus, we can use the bisection search over t2 to get the greatest value of t2. Note that
our initial bisection interval for t2 is [ t1,ot2,ot1 , t2,i,u] where t2,i,u is the maximum feasible value for t2, and
t1,ot2,o
t1
is chosen so that the optimal t2 we find at the end of the bisection search will produce a product
t1t2 that is greater than our currently saved optimal t1,ot2,o. With this approach, after each iteration, if a
t2 value is found, the new optimal t1,ot2,o will be greater than the previous one. Note that our iteration’s
stop criterion is t1t2,i,u < t1,ot2,o. This means that further decrease in the value of t1 will not produce a
product t1t2 that is greater than our current t1,ot2,o. Thus, the value t1,ot2,o at the end of this algorithm will
be the global maximum since we have already checked all possible pairs t1, t2 that are candidates for the
optimal value.
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IV. ROBUST BEAMFORMING DESIGN
All of the beamforming methods discussed heretofore rely on the assumption that the exact knowledge
of the channel state information is available for design. However, when the exact CSI is unavailable, the
performance of these beamforming techniques may degrade severely. Motivated by this, the problem of
robust beamforming design is addressed in [32] and [33]. The robust beamforming for MISO secrecy
communications was studied in [29] where the duality between the cognitive radio MISO channel and
secrecy MISO channel is exploited to transform the robust design of the transmission strategy over the
secrecy channel into a robust cognitive radio beamforming design problem.
We additionally remark that, beside the assumption of perfect channel state information, our previous
analysis is applicable only when the relays are fully synchronized at the symbol level. When the time
synchronization between the relays is poor, the signal replicas passed through different relays will arrive
to the destination node with different delays. This will result in inter-symbol-interference (ISI). To combat
such ISI, the authors of [30] view an asynchronous flat-fading relay network as an artificial multipath
channel (where each channel path corresponds to one particular relay), and use the orthogonal frequency
division multiplexing (OFDM) scheme at the source and destination nodes to deal with this artificial
multipath channel. In [31], a filter-and-forward protocol has been introduced for frequency selective relay
networks, and several related network beamforming techniques have been developed. In these techniques,
the relays deploy finite impulse response (FIR) filters to compensate for the effect of source-to-relay and
relay-to-destination channels. Since the relay synchronization problem is out of the scope of this paper,
we will mainly focus on combatting the effect of imperfect channel state information in the following
discussion.
Systems robust against channel mismatches can be obtained by two approaches. In most of robust
beamforming methods, the perturbation is modeled as a deterministic one with bounded norm which lead
to a worst cast optimization. The other approach applied to the case in which the CSI error is unbounded
is the statistical approach which provides the robustness in the form of confidence level measured by
probability.
Let us consider the DF case. We define Hˆ = hˆhˆ† and Zˆ = zˆzˆ† as the channel estimators, and H˜ = H−Hˆ
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and Z˜ = Z − Zˆ as the estimation errors. First, consider the worst case optimization. In the worst case
assumption, H˜ and Z˜ are bounded in their Frobenius norm as ||H˜|| ≤ ǫH , ||Z˜|| ≤ ǫZ , where ǫH , ǫZ are
assumed to be upper bounds of the channel uncertainty. Based on the result of [32], the robust counterpart
of previously discussed SDR-based optimization problem can be written as
max
X,t
t
s.t tr(X((Hˆ− ǫHI)− t(Zˆ+ ǫZI)) ≥ N0(t− 1),
and diag(X) ≤ p, and X  0.
(69)
Note that the total power constraint tr(X) ≤ PT can be added into the formulation or substituted for the
individual power constraint in (69). This problem can be solved the same way as discussed before.
However, the worst-case approach requires the norms to be bounded, which is usually not satisfied in
practice. Also, this approach is too pessimistic since the probability of the worst-case may be extremely low.
Hence, statistical approach is a good alternative in certain scenarios. In our case, we require the probability
of the non-outage for secrecy transmission is greater than the predefined threshold ε by imposing
Pr
(
N0 + tr((Hˆ+ H˜)X)
N0 + tr((Zˆ+ Z˜)X)
≥ t
)
= Pr
(
tr
(
X(Hˆ+ H˜− t(Zˆ+ Z˜)) ≥ N0(t− 1)
))
≥ ε. (70)
Now, the optimization problem under imperfect CSI can be expressed as
max
X,t
t
s.t P r
(
tr
(
X(Hˆ+ H˜− t(Zˆ+ Z˜)) ≥ N0(t− 1)
))
≥ ε,
and diag(X) ≤ p (or tr(X) ≤ PT ), and X  0.
(71)
If relays are under individual power constraints, we use diag(X) ≤ p. Otherwise, for the case of total
power constraint, we use tr(X) ≤ PT . We can also impose both constraints in the optimization.
Note that the distribution of the components of the error matrices H˜ and Z˜ depend on the channel
estimation technique and distribution of the channel coefficients. In order to simplify the analysis and
provide an analytically and numerically tractable approach, we assume that the components of the Hermitian
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channel estimation error matrices H˜ and Z˜ are independent, zero-mean, circularly symmetric, complex
Gaussian random variables with variances σ2
H˜
and σ2
Z˜
. Such an assumption is also used in [33]. Now, we
can rearrange the probability in the constraint as
Pr
(
tr
(
(Hˆ− tZˆ+ H˜− tZ˜)X
)
≥ (t− 1)N0)
)
. (72)
Let us define y = tr
(
(Hˆ− tZˆ+ H˜− tZ˜)X
)
. For given X, Hˆ, and Zˆ, we know from the results of
[33] that y is a Gaussian distributed random variable with mean µ = tr
(
(Hˆ− tZˆ)X
)
and variance
σ2y = (σ
2
H˜
+ t2σ2
Z˜
) tr(XX†). Then, the non-outage probability can be written as
Pr(y ≥ (t− 1)N0) =
∫ ∞
(t−1)N0
1√
2πσy
exp
(
−(y − µ)
2
2σ2y
)
(73)
=
1
2
− 1
2
erf
(
(t− 1)N0 − µ√
2σy
)
≥ ε, (74)
or equivalently as,
(t− 1)N0 − µ√
2σy
≤ erf−1(−2ε+ 1). (75)
Note that ε should be close to one for good performance. Thus, both −2ε + 1 and (t−1)N0−µ√
2σy
should be
negative valued. Note further that we have tr(XX†) = ‖X‖2, and hence σy =
√
σ2
H˜
+ t2σ2
Z˜
‖X‖. Then,
this constraint can be written as
‖X‖ ≤ (t− 1)N0 − µ√
2(σ2
H˜
+ t2σ2
Z˜
)erf−1(−2ε+ 1)
. (76)
As a result, the optimization problem becomes
max
X,t
t
s.t ||X|| ≤ (t− 1)N0 − µ√
2(σ2
H˜
+ t2σ2
Z˜
)erf−1(−2ε+ 1)
,
and diag(X) ≤ p(or tr(X) ≤ PT ), and X  0.
(77)
Using the same bisection search, we can solve this optimization numerically.
22
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We assume that {gm}, {hm}, {zm} are complex, circularly symmetric Gaussian random variables with
zero mean and variances σ2g , σ2h, and σ2z respectively. We first provide numerical results for decode-and-
forward beamforming schemes. In our numerical results, we focus on the performance of second-hop
secrecy rate since the main emphasis of this paper is on the design of the beamforming system in the
second-hop. Moreover, each figure is plotted for fixed realizations of the Gaussian channel coefficients.
Hence, the secrecy rates in the plots are instantaneous secrecy rates.
In Figures 2 and 3, we plot the second-hop secrecy rate, which is the maximum secrecy rate that our
collaborative relay beamforming system can support under both total and individual relay power constraints.
For the case of individual relay power constraints, we assume that the relays have the same power budgets:
pi =
PT
M
. Specifically, in Fig. 2, we have σh = 3, σz = 1, N0 = 1 and M = 5. In this case, the legitimate
user has a stronger channel. In Fig. 3, the only changes are σh = 1 and σz = 2, which imply that the
eavesdropper has a stronger channel. Our CRB system can achieve secure transmission even when the
eavesdropper has more favorable channel conditions. As can be seen from the figures, the highest secrecy
rate is achieved, as expected, under a total transmit power constraint. On the other hand, we observe that
only a relatively small rate loss is experienced under individual relay power constraints. Moreover, we note
that our two different optimization approaches give nearly the same result. It also can be seen that under
individual power constraint, the simple suboptimal method suffers a constant loss as compared to SDR or
SOCP based optimal value.
In Fig. 4, we fix the relay total transmitting power as PT = 10dB, and vary the number of collaborative
relays. Other parameters are the same as those used in Fig. 3. We can see that increasing M , increases
the secrecy rate under both total and individual power constraints. We also observe that in some cases,
increasing M can degrade the performance when our simplified suboptimal beamformer is used.
In Fig. 5, we plot the secrecy rate for amplify-and-forward collaborative relay beamforming system for
both individual and total power constraints. We also provide the result of suboptimal achievable secrecy
rate for comparison. The fixed parameters are σg = 10, σh = 2, σz = 2, and M = 10. Since the AF secrecy
rates depend on both the source and relay powers, the rate curves are plotted as a function of PT/Ps. As
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Fig. 2. DF Second-hop secrecy rate vs. the total relay transmit power PT for different cases. Eavesdropper has a weaker channel.
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Fig. 3. DF Second-hop secrecy rate vs. the total relay transmit power PT for different cases. Eavesdropper has a stronger channel.
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Fig. 4. DF second-hop secrecy rate vs. number of relays for different cases.
before, we assume that the relays have equal powers in the case in which individual power constraints are
imposed, i.e., pi = PT/M . It is immediately seen from the figure that the achievable rates for both total
and individual power constraints are very close to the corresponding optimal ones. Thus, the achievable
beamforming scheme is a good alternative in the amplify-and-forward relaying case due to the fact that
it has much less computational burden. Moreover, we interestingly observe that imposing individual relay
power constraints leads to only small losses in the secrecy rates with respect to the case in which we have
total relay power constraints.
In Fig. 6, we plot the maximum second hop secrecy rate of decode-and-forward that we can achieve for
different power PT and non-outage probability ε values. In this figure, we fix M = 5. hˆ and zˆ are randomly
picked from Rayleigh fading with σhˆ = 1 and σzˆ = 2, and we assume that estimation errors are inversely
proportional to PT . More specifically, in our simulation, we have σ2H˜ = 0.1/PT and σ
2
Z˜
= 0.2/PT . We also
assume the relays are operating under equal individual power constraints, i.e., pi = PTM . It is immediately
observed in Fig. 6 that smaller rates are supported under higher non-outage probability requirements. In
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Fig. 5. AF secrecy rate vs. PT /Ps. σg = 10, σh = 2, σz = 2,M = 10.
particular, this figure illustrates that our formulation and the proposed optimization framework can be used
to determine how much secrecy rate can be supported at what percentage of the time. For instance, at
PT = 20dB, we see that approximately 7.4 bits/symbol secrecy rate can be attained 70 percent of the time
(i.e., ε = 0.7) while supported secrecy rate drops to about 6.2 bits/symbol when ε = 0.95.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, collaborative beamforming for both DF and AF relaying is studied under secrecy constraints.
Optimal beamforming designs that maximize secrecy rates are provided under both total and individual relay
power constraints. For DF with total power constraint, we have remarked that the optimal beamforming
vector is the solution of a Rayleigh quotient problem. We have further identified the beamforming structure
in the high- and low-SNR regimes. For DF with individual relay power constraints and AF with both total
and individual relay power constraints, we have formulated the problem as a semidefinite programming
problem and provided an optimization framework. We have also provided an alternative SOCP method to
solve the DF relaying with individual power constraints. In addition, for DF relaying, we have described
26
0 5 10 15 20
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
PT(dB)
se
cr
e
cy
 ra
te
 (b
its
/sy
mb
ol)
ε=0.95
ε=0.9
ε=0.8
ε=0.7
Fig. 6. DF second secrecy rate vs. PT under different ε.
the worst-case robust beamforming design when CSI is imperfect but bounded, and the statistical robust
beamforming design based upon minimum non-outage probability criterion. Finally, we have provided
numerical results to illustrate the performance of beamforming techniques under different assumptions,
e.g., DF and AF relaying, total and individual relay power constraints, perfect and imperfect channel
information.
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